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Revisiting the economy by taking into account 
the different dimensions of well-being
Abstract
In standard economic models benevolent governments are the unique actors in charge to tackle the 
problem of reconciling individual with social wellbeing in presence of negative externalities and 
insufficient provision of public goods. Some promising practices of grassroot economics suggest 
however  that,  even  a  minoritarian  share  of  concerned  individuals  and  socially  responsible 
corporations which internalise externalities, significantly enhance the opportunities of promoting 
“sustainable happiness” harmonising creation of economic, social and environmental value.
Leonardo Becchetti
University of Rome Tor Vergata
1. Introduction
In an era of shirking budget constraints synergies between the public sector and the “grassroot 
economics” animated by NGOs, “socially concerned” consumers and investors are fundamental to 
reach Lisbon Goals.
A crucial element of Lisbon Goals is that they help us to look in a three-dimensional way to the 
problem of human wellbeing in the third millennium. The monodimensional approach represented 
by the exclusive focus on the pursuit of economic growth is integrated into a wider framework 
which introduces in the picture social cohesion and environmental sustainability.
Along this path it is reasonable to assume that in the future it will be normal to reason in terms of an 
“integrated  general  economic  equilibrium”  in  which  the  multifarious  impact  of  entrepreneurial 
activities will  be properly taken  into  account.  In the standard  approach  firms produce material 
output and the question of social and environmental externalities is tackled by governmental and 
regulatory authorities. In the new integrated approach looming at the horizon it will we understood
that entrepreneurial activities produce other kinds of output (waste, social values, etc.) by modifying 
the environment and the society in which they operate. The ambitious goal of the social enterprises 
or  of  the  ethical  and  solidarity  initiatives  (fair  trade,  microfinance,  ethical  banking,  ethical 
travelling, solidarity purchasing groups) is to go beyond the dichotomy of the two moments of 
production and distribution by creating economic value already in a socially and environmentally 
sustainable  way.  These  initiatives  fully  acknowledge  that  productive  activities,  beyond  what  is 
considered their standard output, generates (or destroys) natural resources, human relationships, self 
esteem, social capital and that, in many paradoxical cases, the strive for profit maximisation may 
disregard the fact that destruction of the above mentioned immaterial resources may create social 
and environmental problems which must be costly addressed by public authorities. The problem 
may then be alternatively handled by anonymous beaurocracies or by grassroot organisations which 
take advantage from closer proximity to the problem, attract voluntary work and develop specific 
skills to address the social issues at stake.
This is why it is in the absolute interest of the governments and of the regional and local authorities 
to work together and create synergies with the network of ethical and solidarity initiatives. 
In this paper we motivate this proposition by i) looking at the interaction between material and 
immaterial variables in the socioeconomic environment; ii) discussing the main features of the most 3
successful ethical and solidarity initiatives and iii) outlining the potential role of government in 
supporting them.
The paper is divided into six sections (introduction and conclusions included). In the second section 
we  provide  a  short  survey  of  the  most  prominent  ethical  and  solidarity  economic  initiatives 
currently at stake.  More  specifically we  focus  on microfinance, fair trade,  responsible tourism, 
solidarity  purchasing  groups  and  the  grassroot  participated  welfare  initiative  called  “multiparty 
social contract”.
In the third section we highlight the importance of the role of concerned consumers and investors in
supporting  these  initiatives.  The  latter,  by voting  with  their  portfolios,  may  increase  economic 
convenience of corporate social responsibility, thereby transforming it from a residual element into 
an important factor on which competition among different producers may be played.
In  the  fourth  section  we  generalise  the  previously  described  experiences  by  sketching  a  new 
theoretical background under the form of an “integrated general economic equilibrium” in which 
firms  are  conceived  as  multi-output  productive  units  which  generate  material  and  immaterial 
products and affect not  just  creation of economic value, but  also the social and environmental 
quality of the socioeconomic system. In this framework we point out that socially responsible firms 
and concerned individuals go beyond the traditional reductionism in the conception of firms and 
consumers  in  standard  economic  thinking  since,  with  their  action,  may  reconcile  creation  of 
economic, social and environmental value. In the fifth section we finally discuss the role of local, 
national and EU authorities in supporting ethical and solidarity initiatives. We emphasise here that 
some among the most prominent of them (microfinance, fair trade, ethical banking) have prospered 
without any government support but that such support can significantly tilt the competitive race 
toward socially responsible corporations with some ad hoc regulatory or fiscal measures. The final 
section concludes.
2. The importance of ethical and solidarity initiatives 
The most relevant initiatives of ethical and participated economy on which we focus in this paper 
are those of microfinance, fair trade, responsible travelling, solidarity purchasing groups and some 
promising grassroot welfare actions such as those of the multiparty social contract.4
As it  is  well known microfinance
1 institutions represent a significant  advancement in  banking 
activities due to their superior capacity of fulfilling on of the main roles of banks in the economic 
system, that is, matching individuals with ideas with those having financial resources to support it, 
even when the former cannot financially back the required loan. Traditionally, the banking system 
has  successfully  performed  some  fundamental  roles  (quality  asset  transformation,  liquidity 
services,
2  pooling  of  savers  financial  resources,  project  selection)  but  it  has  been  incapable  of 
lending to poor uncollateralized borrowers.   This is because in the standard anthropological and 
economic culture borrowers are looked at with suspicions and are assumed to behave like homines
oeconomici.
3 This strand of thought explains that asymmetric information between borrowers and 
lenders in three crucial phases of the lending relationship (ex ante selection of projects, interim 
monitoring of borrower’s effort and ex post verification of results) generates the three well known
pathologies of adverse selection (higher lending rates are likely to select worse quality/higher risk
borrowers), moral hazard (the borrower may shirk if he is not fully monitored) and strategic default
(the borrower may declare at the end of the project that he is unable to pay even if this is not the 
case). 
In this mainstream line of thought the collateral is the fundamental deterrent which prevents the 
three pathologies and, more generally, “homo oeconomicus” borrowers from taking actions which 
are against the interest of the bank. 
The success of microfinance (more than 3,000 microfinance institutions around the world, a ratio of 
nonperforming loans over total loans below that of the standard banking system even if borrowers 
are mostly uncollateralized) is leading theoreticians to revise their ideas on the lender-borrower 
relationship.
One of the main rationales advanced to explain the success of microfinance is the mechanism of 
group lending with joint liability. If group members are economically responsible in case of failure 
of one of their mates they have the incentive to match with good borrowers (assortative matching) 
and to monitor them accurately during the investment period. In this way the bank can solve the 
                                                
1 The origin of modern microfinance traces back to the creation of Grameen Bank in 1983 after a 
pioneering activity of Muhammad Yunus who started in 1976 to experiment the effects of lending 
small sums to poor borrowers without asking collateral. The development of microfinance has been 
astounding.  The  Grameen  Bank  has  now  six  million  borrowers  and  the  Microcredit  Summit 
Campaign at end 2006 documents the existence of 3,133 microfinance programs around the world 
reaching approximately 113 million borrowers and, among them, 82 millions in straight poverty
conditions. The most outstanding element of the performance of MFIs is their extremely low share 
of nonperforming loans. According to the most systematic source of aggregate data on MFIs, - the 
Micro Banking Bullettin (http://www.mixmbb.org/en) which created a panel of 200 MFIs from 
different world continents – the average MFIs loan loss rate was 1 percent in 2005. The literature 
provides various interpretations for this surprising performance. The most reputed among them are 
the  role  of  group lending  with  joint  liability  (Ghatak,  2000;  Stiglitz,  1990  and  Armendariz  de 
Aghion, 1999), which is however neither adopted by all MFIs nor by the same Grameen after its 
2000 reform, and the capacity of MFI loan officers of accumulating soft information in the Berger 
and Udell sense (2002) which is crucial to assess creditworthiness of small businesses.
2 For liquidity services we mean that banks match liquid liabilities with illiquid assets. This is one 
of the main roles of credit intermediaries which gives real investors the possibility of running their 
projects even when depositors want back their money. As it is easy to understand liquidity services 
are also at the root of banks’  fragility.
3 As Amarthya Sen clearly explains in his 1977 paper homines economici are “rational fools”. This 
is because this standard anthropological approach followed by economists assumes that individuals 
are motivated only by self interest (which is obviously the most part) and not also by simphathy 
(passion for others) and commitment (moral duty even when it is against self interest). 5
asymmetric  information  problem  relying  on  the  capacity  of  local  borrowers  of  knowing  and 
selecting each other.
However,  large  part  of  microfinance  experience  does  not  rely  on  group  lending  and  the  same 
Grameen Bank (the leading microfinance institution funded by Junus the recent nobel price for 
peace) in the second and current phase of its activity is no more based on such lending practice. As 
a  consequence,  reasons  for  microfinance  success  go  beyond  group  lending  and  cannot  be 
understood if we are not ready not modify our anthropological view of the homo oeconomicus. 
What  microfinance  adds  to  our  anthropological  concepts  is  that  there  are  immaterial  factors 
(dignity, social capital, self esteem) which are crucial for individual wellbeing and that a borrower’s 
delinquent  behaviour  would  endanger.  A  poor  marginalised  individual  who  has  a  chance  of 
inclusion through a microfinance loan and experiences an increase in dignity and self esteem does 
not want to loose what he has conquered on a social point of view.  In addition to it, a good system 
of incentives to avoid loan non restitution may also abstract from group lending and joint liability 
and be based on progressive lending since failure to repay current instalments may prevent the 
possibility of receiving the next loan. 
Microfinance is included within the realm of ethical and solidarity initiatives as it directly aims at 
providing opportunities to individuals to escape poverty. It is also a grassroot initiative since it has
been historically “subsidised” by socially responsible savers who accepted a lower return on their 
deposits in exchange of the moral “satisfaction” of financing the poor (we may express the same 
concept  by  saying  that  MFIs  have  conquered  an  ethical  premium  when  they  collect  financial 
resources which allows them to pay a rate below the equilibrium market one in such circumstance).
It is also important to avoid the idealisation of microfinance. The wide range of experiences around 
the world include many different approaches and methodologies. From those of institutions which 
sacrifice their profits and  whose primary goal is inclusion of the poor, to those of MFIs who are 
standard profit maximisers and therefore charge significantly higher loan rates to their borrowers 
but still do microfinance.
The experience of microfinance in Europe is much less dispersed and fragmented. It is much more
difficult in our context to identify targets of potential customers. The most promising fields of 
action seem to be those of consumption loans to liquidity constrained borrowers, of small loans for 
start up of small entrepreneurial activities, of loans tailored for immigrants starting activities in 
Europe and, finally, of student loans.
More  in  general,  the  main  problem  that  microfinance  must  tackle  is  its  capacity  of  enabling 
borrowers to scale up, that is of giving borrowers the opportunity of access to high added value 
entrepreneurial activities instead of trapping them permanently into low productive activities around 
the subsistence level.
4 Among the  thousands experiences on the field some of them are successful 
and some other not from this point of view. We cannot however be too severe with microfinance by 
demanding a degree of vertical mobility for low end classes which is never observed in the reality. 
A reasonable performance indicator on which we may agree is that of “intergenerational mobility”. 
At minimum we should require that microfinance must be effective in allowing borrowers children 
to invest in their human capital and in giving them more opportunities than it would have occurred 
in the counterfactual situation.
In parallel with the development of microfinance, new socially responsible banking initiatives
have been developed in industrialised countries. The example of Banca Etica in Italy and the action 
of similar banks in other European countries have shown that a bank may survive and prosper by 
completely changing the ranking of its priorities and by putting as its first priority the creation of 
                                                
4 From this point of view it is acknowledged that microfinance loan structure based on high 
frequency instalments may not help to finance long term high risk innovative projects.6
social and environmental value. The history of Banca Etica demonstrates that this choice may also 
be economically convenient. First, if the reputation of an ethical bank is sound, it is possible for her 
to earn an ethical premium from investors which are willing to accept a lower return on its bonds in 
exchange of the satisfaction for contributing to social and environmental well being. Second, Banca 
Etica has helped the banking system to rediscover that its main resource is customer’s trust and that, 
paradoxically,  the  obsessive  search  of  short  term  profits  with (profit  oriented)  performance 
incentives on bank officers could endanger such resource. This is because, if the profit performance 
targets  need  to  be  reached  at  all  costs,  they  can  trigger  excess  risk  taking  or  even  fraudulent 
behaviour at the expenses of bank customers. Such imbalance in the ranking of priorities of the 
banking system (that experiences such as that of Banca Etica try to revert) may therefore be at the 
origin of bank crises and ethical banking may therefore contribute to reduce such systemic risk. 
One of the most increasingly popular initiatives of grassroot economics is fair trade. The idea was 
born in the Netherlands in the second half of the twentieth century. It is symbolically relevant that it 
is born in the country which was one of the pioneers of the standard North-South trade.
Fair trade  goal is to promote inclusion of poor farmers in global product markets, via consumption 
and trade, through a package of benefits which include anti-cyclical mark-ups on prices, long-term 
relationships,  credit  facilities  and  business  angel  consultancy  aimed  at  supporting  producers’ 
capacity building (Becchetti. Costantino, 2007).
5
FT grew significantly in the recent past (Moore, 2004; Hayes, 2004). In the last five years net sales 
in Europe have grown by 40 percent per year and FT products (sold not only by specialised retailers 
such as “world shops” but also by most supermarket chains) have conquered significant market 
shares (49 percent of bananas in Switzerland, around 20 percent in the UK  and 3.3 percent in the 
US of ground coffee according to data of the FT importers’ association). 
At the beginning of its history fair trade has been criticised by mainstream economists on two 
grounds. First, the price premium paid to marginalised primary producers in the South has been 
seen as a distortion of the market clearing price. Such distortion is accused to give wrong market 
incentives  to  local  producers  and  to  ultimately  lead  to  an  excess  supply  of  primary  products. 
Second, it has been argued that the purchase of a standard product plus a donation would be more 
welfare enhancing than the fair trade purchase (LeClair, 2002; Maseland and De Vaal, 2002). 
Further developments of the debate led to contrast the first objection in two respects. First, the 
transaction between marginalised producers and local intermediaries or large transnationals which 
is at the basis of standard trade does not occur on the basis of equal bargaining power between the 
two counterparts. The situation is more akin to that of monopsony or oligopsony in which the buyer 
has much more market power than the sellers. As it is well known, in monopsony the price paid is 
below that of perfect competition and therefore a case for government intervention setting a higher 
minimum price arises. Fair trade may therefore be conceived as a welfare enhancing minimum price 
initiative promoted by private importers and socially responsible consumers. Empirical evidence of 
the different fair trade projects confirms that the monopsony power of moneylenders in informal 
credit markets and of local intermediaries transporting the product to international markets exists 
and is strong.
Second, the same price premium creates a different product (the fair trade coffee is different from 
the standard coffee, exactly as the green coffee is different from the other two) and therefore fair 
trade may be conceived as a general purpose innovation which creates bundles of products which 
are original combinations of material and ethical features. Such products have their own demand 
and supply schedules and therefore their (intermediate) prices cannot be seen as distortions of the 
                                                
5 Evidence for such premium on prices of coffee beans and cocoa in the last 20 years is well known, 
available from the authors upon request and omitted here for reasons of space.7
standard  products  traditionally  sold  on  the  market  since  they  are  exactly  the  source  of  the 
innovation appreciated by ethical consumers.
The  second  type  of  objection  (better  a  standard  purchase  plus  a  charity  donation)  may  be 
counterargued  by exploring more in depth fair  trade characteristics. Two of the main positive 
effects of it are; i) “local antitrust” action which, as mentioned above, breaks the monopsony power 
of local intermediaries  and of the  monopoly  of  local moneylender;  ii)  the capacity of  creating 
contagion on profit maximising competitors of fair trade in the distribution and in the production
industries.
These  two  relevant  effects  cannot  be  achieved  by  the  purchase  of  a  standard  product  plus  a 
donation.
On  the second point, it is worthwhile to remark that the alliance between a minority of responsible 
consumers and the action of socially responsible pioneers (microfinance, ethical banks, fair trade) 
has the merit of triggering partial imitation on behalf of profit maximising competitors thereby 
increasing the level of social responsibility in the overall system.
6
Recent impact studies on fair trade have wondered  whether affiliation to fair trade really generated 
those  benefits  claimed  by ethical  importers.  Results  on Kenya and  Perù  compare wellbeing  of 
affiliated and non affiliated farmers (Becchetti-Costantino, 2008; Becchetti et al., 2007). They show 
that the price premium is consistent and that it determines superior changes in income, consumption 
and  human  development  indicators  for  affiliated  producers  with  respect  to  the  control  sample.
Investment  in  human  capital  is  demonstrated  also  to  be  significantly  higher.  The  limits  of  the 
initiative are that lack of complementarities with macro interventions on infrastructures may prevent 
interested  areas  to  start  a  robust  development  process.    The  accordance  of  micro  and  macro 
initiatives is, as usual, the most powerful driver of change.
Ethical travelling follows a principle similar to that of fair trade since it aims at rebalancing the 
division of value along the value chain between local workers and large international transnationals. 
This  initiative  also  pays  attention  to  the  environmental  sustainability  of  tourism.  Interesting 
synergies between ethical travelling and fair trade have been shown to generate significant positive 
effects on beneficiaries. Becchetti et al. (2007) show that marginalised producers in Perù (in the 
Juliaca and Chulucanas areas) being part of organisations (Minka and Allpa respectively) selling to 
fair trade can get with the latter prices which are more than 100% higher than those paid by local 
intermediaries. However, since the area in which such producers operate is also included in tours of 
socially responsible tourism, it has been demonstrated that the latter pay up to 30 percent more of 
fair trade importers. Furthermore, sales to ethical tourists have been shown to increase professional 
self esteem even more than those to fair traders since the former appreciate and buy final products 
and therefore provide a direct feedback to local producers on the quality of their goods.
A recent development in socially responsible consumption is that of solidarity purchasing groups
(SPGs) buying products directly from local producers.
                                                
6 One of the most remarkable features of the fair trade phenomenon is the contagion of big players 
in the production and distribution industry (Nestlè started in October 2005 to introduce a fair trade 
product in its product range, Coop UK launched its own fair trade product line, Starbuck rapidly 
became the main seller of FT coffee in the last years). Becchetti, Di Giallonardo and Tessitore 
(2007) show that, in a horizontal differentiation duopoly in which firms compete on prices and 
ethical features of the product, partial adoption of FT practices is the optimal strategy for profit 
maximising incumbents after fair trader’s entry. 8
We may examine characteristics of the SPG initiatives  compared with those of fair trade. The 
economic problems are very similar. Also in developed countries producers of agricultural primary 
products are locked in the lowest part of the value chain and intermediaries and final retailers get 
most  of  the  value  added.  The  idea  also  here  is  to  link  directly  “responsible”  and  concerned 
consumers with primary producers in order to ensure fair prices to the latter. 
The SPG initiatives have also three additional advantages with respect to fair trade: discounted 
prices with respect with respect to standard market competitors; proximity between consumers and 
primary producers and a more direct and visible environmental impact. For these reasons the SPG
initiative has an enormous potential and appears as economically convenient also for non concerned 
consumers.  The  desire  to  have  genuine,  lower  price,  local  products  whose  production  can  be 
verified personally satisfies the taste for unsophisticated, ecological and healthy products also for 
consumers without particular ethical concerns.
The economics of ethical and solidarity initiatives is continuously producing new ideas and projects
which  provide  new  grassroot  welfare  solutions.  One  of  the  most  interesting  of  them  is  the 
multiparty  social  contract  (MSC),  an  initiative  which  enhances  synergies  between  different 
grassroot actors and local institutions.
The MSC, developed experimentally in Alsace with the support of the Council of Europe, addresses 
the problem of individuals who fall into the plague of overindebtedness and usury. In order to solve 
this complex problem it creates a net of protection and solidarity involving different organisations 
which  jointly  address  the  social  problem.  The  network  is  composed  by  fair  trade,  solidarity 
purchasing groups, organisations of psychotherapists, ethical banks and charity organisations. The 
joint action of them allows to organise an integrated action which deals with all economic and 
psychological aspects of overindebtedness. Side products of this initiative are the enhanced capacity 
of member organisations to operate together. 
The success of the program consists in the transformation of the beneficiaries from part of the 
problem to part of the solution of it. At the end of the process they often become activists of the 
same multiparty social contract and try to convince other people in need to take part to it.
Consistently with the overall theoretical picture to which this paper is inspired, the success of the 
multiparty  social  contract  depends  on  its  capacity  of  addressing  jointly  all  economic  and 
psychological aspects of the overindebtedness problem. The vision behind it fully acknowledges 
that the life satisfaction does not depend only on material wellbeing but also by those immaterial 
factors such as dignity, self-esteem and trust which are fundamental drivers of the capacity of each 
individual to give a contribution to the society in which he lives.
3. The role of citizens 
The Eisenberg principle  of indeterminacy which  prevents theoretical  models  to  maintain stable 
features  across  time,  due  to  changes  in  the  interaction  of  the  same  factors  and  systems  under 
observation,  can  be  applied all  the  more  so  to  social  sciences  where  the  “basic object”  of 
investigation is the human being who interacts with social, economic and political variables and 
modifies his behaviour across time.
The  indeterminacy  principle  applies  even  more  to  the  question  of  the  survival  and  growth  of 
ethically responsible enterprises. Their success crucially depends in fact not just on internal factors 
such as employees motivation but also from the support of socially responsible consumers. Even in 
the most  optimistic  scenarios in  which such  enterprises can  compete  in  price  and quality with 
standard  firms,  the  acknowledgement  of  an  ethical  premium  by  the  public  may  dramatically 
increase their chances of success.
In this respect recent empirical advances and results from lab experiments reject the reductionist 
hypothesis of individuals only moved by self interest and fully support Sen’s idea that sympathy 
and commitment are important elements in the picture. More specifically, experiments on trust, 9
dictator and public good games fully reveal that, even though self interest obviously remains a 
dominant factor, players are also moved by inequity aversion, strategic or pure altruism and “warm 
glow” preferences (i.e. they get satisfaction from the pure pleasure of giving).
7
These additional motivations of human action help us to understand why the willingness to pay for 
socially  and  environmentally  responsible  features  of  products  is  growing  significantly.  Several 
consumer surveys run in different OECD countries show that the share of those who would prefer a 
socially responsible product for the same level of price and quality is above 50 percent. The driver 
of this desire is not just altruism: enlightened (or longsighted) self interest may be enough. In the 
environmental field the link between the public and private good elements of the issue is absolutely 
evident. Care for environmental sustainability is not only good per se but also for the positive 
consequences it directly brings to any individual. This is particularly clear in two directions. First, 
the deterioration of a non reproducible and non appropriable resource such as climate is clearly 
perceived as affecting every individual even though the consequences are not the same for everyone 
and  the  poor  are  always  less  capable  than  the  rich  to  protect  themselves  from  environmental 
calamities. 
Second, green products are extremely appreciated by consumers since the latter clearly perceive that 
tracking the productive chain will reduce the uncertainty about the origin and productive process of 
the product and the health problems which may arise from it.
Even though the link between private and public good elements for fair trade or socially responsible 
products  is  slightly  more  difficult  to  perceive,  such  link  remains  robust  and  should  be  more 
effectively explained to consumers. As it is well known from the economic literature, the main 
source of (illegal)  migration is the difference in per capita income between country of origin and 
country of destination. Moreover, in globalised labour markets poor standard of living of unskilled 
workers in less developed countries is the main source of wage competition which endangers work 
rights of equally low skilled employees in industrialised countries. 
Once these links are properly acknowledged it should be absolutely clear that socially responsible 
consumption and saving is a “natural” economic action which reconcile the dichotomy between our 
worker  and  consumer  selves.  As  consumers  our  welfare  depends  directly  from  the  difference 
between our maximum willingness to pay and the market price and therefore lower prices increase 
it. However, too low prices may create pressure on workers rights of that specific industry, but also 
contribute to a more general climate of pressure on workers wellbeing and therefore be in contrast 
with our interest as workers. 
To sum up, the “portfolio vote” attributed via socially responsible consumption and investment is 
primarily an increase in participation and economic democracy. We vote once every four-five years 
for coalitions with articulated political programs of which we appreciate some, but inevitably not 
all, aspects. With socially responsible consumption we can vote everyday and more precisely by 
evaluating, not just price and quality, but also the social and environmental production of a given 
corporation.
A final intriguing element of this new phenomenon of grassroot action is that it contributes to 
increase market dignity. As it is well known the market has some important qualities - i) capacity of 
generating spontaneously a decentralised price clearing equilibrium which reconciles interests of a 
large number of anonymous consumers and producers; ii) capacity of providing right signals with 
prices about relative scarcity and tastes for a given products; ii) quality of being a mechanism 
which,  from  the  starting  point  of  transactors  endowments,  can  generate  a  deal  which  is 
advantageous for both. What the market cannot do (or could not do so far) was a social intervention 
aimed at affecting the starting conditions of individuals. To make a cruel example, an extremely 
                                                
7 We refer for example to the experimental results on Ultimatum games (Camerer and Thaler 1995), 
Dictator Games (Andreoni and Miller 2002), Gift Exchange Games (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Reidl, 
1993, Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter 1998), Trust Games (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 
1995) and Public Good Games (Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 2001; Fehr and Gächter 2000).10
deprived individual in need of financial resources may decide to sell voluntarily his kidneys to a 
rich consumer. The market allows both of them to realise the transactions but cannot do anything to 
solve the social problem which is at the origin of such transaction.
The novelty of socially responsible consumption is that, for the first time, it is possible to use the 
market mechanism to address directly social issues.   By financing microfinance or buying fair trade 
products we can at the same time vote and contribute to the inclusion of the poor and improvement 
of their economic conditions with a simple market action.
What is absolutely obvious and cannot be neglected is that illustrating the potential of ethical and 
solidarity initiatives does not imply arguing at the same time that institutions and rules are no more 
important, just because we discovered market mechanisms which may be used to address social 
issues.  Such  mechanisms  only  want  to  emphasize  that,  given  the  characteristics  of  the  current 
economic system, there are new synergies between grassroot and institutional action which may be 
exploited to reinforce effectiveness of actions aimed at improving society wellbeing.
4. Toward a model of “integrated general economic equilibrium” 
In this section we want to generalise the characteristics of the interaction between “ethical pioneers” 
and socially responsible consumers. We try to make them clearer with a small example accessible 
also to nontechnical readers what we mean by “multiproduct” firms and what can be the advantage 
of having firms who reconcile creation of economic value with social and environmental 
sustainability.
The standard textbook approach conceives a firm production function in the following way:
Y=f(K,L,H) (1)
The firm produces the material output Y (goods or services sold on the market) with the production 
function f(.) by using as inputs physical capital (K), workers (L) and human capital (H), that is, 
workers’ knowledge accumulated through schooling years and learning on the job.
This  approach completely neglects  that  corporate  activity is  more  than  just  producing material 
output. What we mean here is that “immaterial” variables such as “relational goods”,
8 workers self 
esteem,
9 interpersonal trust, social capital
10 are not the same before and after productive activity. In 
                                                
8 According to a recent literature (Ulhaner, 1989; Gui, 2000; Gui and Sugden, 2005) relational 
goods are a specific kind of local public goods which are simultaneously consumed when produced. 
Examples of relational goods are, on small scale, love or family relationships and, on large scale, 
many kinds of social events (club or association meetings, live sport events, etc.). Relational goods 
are local public goods since nonexcludabilty and non rivalry are limited to participants. They are 
simultaneously consumed and produced since participating to them is both an act of production (my 
presence contributes to the increase in the value of the good) and consumption (I enjoy it while 
producing it). 
They also are a special kind of public goods since they should be better defined as anti-rival than 
non rival. This is because their very same nature is based on the interpersonal sharing of them. As a 
consequence,  participation  to  their  production  and  consumption  actually  creates  a  positive 
externality on partners and contributes to the quality of the public good itself. For the same reasons 
partners do not see nonrivalry and nonexcludability as negative elements which prevent them from 
exploiting all private benefits of the good, but as positive elements which implement its value (my 
satisfaction is actually increased, or even crucially determined, by the fact that the other is also 
participating and taking pleasure).
9 Even though the literature on self-esteem is much less extended, the debate between economists 
and psychologists on the causality nexus  between self esteem and life events has taken a very 11
the same way corporate production significantly modifies the environment by producing waste, 
consuming resources and producing emissions. 
An integrated approach to corporate activity should therefore take into account all these correlated 
effects and conceive the production function as follows
h(Y,SE,EN,MO,REL,SC)=f(L(Mo,Se,Rel),K,H,SC) (2)
where, on the left hand side, it is acknowledged that firms produce, in addition to material output
(Y), self esteem (SE), relational goods (REL), social capital (SC), workers morale (MO) and several 
by-products which have strong environmental consequences. An important difference arises also on 
the left hand side where it is acknowledged that “immaterial factors” such as self esteem, morale 
and  relational  goods  are  fundamental  components  of  workers productivity.  To  make  just  some 
examples  on  this  point  consider  that  modern  corporations  may  be  conceived  as  “trust  game 
corporations”  where  productive  output  depends  crucially  on  teamworking  and  on  a  series  of 
complex tasks which require joint application of workers with specific nonoverlapping skills (a 
lawyer, an economist, an engineer, etc.) (Becchetti-Pace, 2007).  The most important feature of joint 
work is  the  creation of  superadditivity (a  result  which is  more  than  the  sum  of  the  individual 
contributions of its participants). Superaddivity has two fundamental rationales. First, by explaining 
things to others we learn better what we think to know. Second, only by joining different pieces of 
the puzzle represented by individual specific know-how, we may reconstruct the overall picture and 
increase our knowledge in a given field.
In this framework low quality of relational  goods among co-workers may seriously harm such 
process. The basic ingredient of it is in fact, as in the standard game theoretic literature of trust 
games, the decision to share information with teammates, a decision which implies the risk of abuse 
and exploitation of such information. In working environments in which quality of relationships 
among workers is lower, there will be less information sharing and no superadditivity with negative
effects on corporate productivity.
In this integrated general equilibrium model individuals maximise their utility/happiness functions 
Max U(C,MO,REL,SE)  (3)
whose arguments are not just consumption but also the same immaterial variables (morale, self 
esteem, relational goods) which are both determinant of their productivity and affected by their 
corporate life.  
The  maximisation  is  subject  to  the  standard  constraint  (4)  which  equals  (after  tax)  disposable 
income (1-t)Y
11 to consumption (px) and savings (S). Finally, relation (5) simply acknowledges that 
investment equal savings in equilibrium
                                                                                                                                                                
similar direction with respect to that of life satisfaction. According to Tafarodi and Swann (2001) 
self-esteem is “the intrinsic perception of one’s self in relation with other people” and is strictly 
related to self-confidence, representing the perceived ability of accomplishing one’s own goals in 
life, since “…those who are liked enjoy a clear advantage in achieving their goals”.
10 Social capital generally identifies the degree of cohesion of a given community under several 
aspects. The most important of them are trust on institutions, interpersonal trust (under the form of 
trust and turstoworthiness) and willingness to pay for public goods. For the role of social capital in 
economic  systems  see  Putnam  (1993),  Zak  and  Knack  (2001)  and  for  its  effects  on  economic 
growth see Knack and Kiefer (1997).
11 t stands for the income tax rate.12
s.t. (1-t)Y=px+S (4)
S=I (5)
With respect to standard homo oeconomicus behaviour our approach rejects the reductionism in the 
conception of individual happiness function (consumption is not the only driver of life satisfaction 
!)  but,  at  the  same  time,  accepts  a  principle  of  rationality  (individual  behaviour  responds  to  a 
strategy which maximises individual goals given time and budget constraints) which we consider a 
reasonable approximation of what on average happens in the reality.
Note that some of the factors determining individual life satisfaction are not subject to the budget 
constraint and may be increased at no cost. The question here is that their satisfaction does not 
depend only on the individual but by the social environment in which he lives, by the corporate 
climate and by the individuals with which he has relationships. To put it simply, the main constraint 
here is not money but others, that is, the disposition of partners in the production and consumption 
of the relational good to invest in it together with the individual at stake.
Finally, as in standard economic models we acknowledge that physical capital, a fundamental input 
in productive activity, follows the standard law of motion
K

 =I-dK   (6)
In which the instantaneous rate of change of capital stock K

is determined by investment (I) minus 
depreciation (calculated by applying the rate d to the stock of capital investment).
In this rudimentary model we also have a standard budget constraint (in which we assume for 
simplicity that the budget clears every period with no generation of debt).
tY=G(EN,SC,REL,SE) (7)
On  the  right  hand  side  of  (7)  we  have  tax  inflow  and,  on  the  right  hand  side,  government 
expenditure. What we want to emphasize here is that such expenditure is a positive function of the 
negative  social  and  environmental  externalities  (all  arguments  in  parenthesis)  created  by 
corporations into their activities. More specifically, the volume of government expenditure is a 
positive function of environmental and social problems.
Imagine now to have two types of firms. The first one is the standard type of profit maximising 
entity  which  does  not  care  about  social  and  environmental  externalities.  Such  firm  produces 
material output and contributes to economic growth but, at the same time, may generate negative 
social and environmental externalities. On the first point (negative social externalities) we may 
assume that negative corporate climates may reduce quality of relational life of their workers, their 
morale  and  self  esteem.  Layoffs  may  produce  marginalisation  which  needs  to  be  tackled  by 
government policies aimed at unemployed rehabilitation etc. Obviously things can go the other way 
round but what we want to underline here is that, in order to evaluate companies contribution to 
creation of economic  value  at aggregate level,  we must  consider not  just the direct productive 
effects but als the indirect effect on the social and environmental dimension of their activities, 
consistently with the concept of their multiproduct production function.
With this respect the role of social enterprises can be very important here. Firms with different 
rankings of priorities which consider their main goal environmental sustainability and creation of 
social  value,  compatibly  with  their  capacity  of  creating  economic  value,  may  maximise  their 
positive  social  and  environmental  contribution  by  alleviating  instead  or  worsening  government 
budget. Practical examples of this are those mentioned in the previous sections and, among them,13
microfinance or ethical banks which contribute to the solution of social problems with their lending 
schemes to unbankables
12 or energy saving companies who restructure houses in order to improve 
their  environmental  efficiency  and  therefore  create  economic  value  by  reducing  environmental 
degradation.  
Several crucial questions arise here. Can socially responsible firms survive in the competitive race 
with the first type of firms (standard profit maximising companies)? How citizens and institutions 
may contribute to the picture ?
The clear synthetic suggestions which comes from the model tells us that these firms survive in that 
i)  they  compensate  superior  costs  (required  by  the  fulfilment  of  more  severe  social  and 
environmental standards) with potential benefits (higher workers productivity due to the high levels 
of immaterial factors such as morale, self esteem and relational goods); ii) a minority of socially 
and environmentally concerned citizens vote with their portfolio in favour of these companies; iii) 
institutions  support  them  with  both  non  costly  (regulation)  and  costly  (tax  allowances,  etc.) 
intervention.
In the section which follows we will enter further into the details of this picture by analysing the 
role of institutions in the proposed framework.
5. The role of the government
Ethical  and  socially  responsible  economic  initiatives  have  born  and  grown  without  any  direct 
government support, even though the latter could have been of great help to them. To provide just 
an  example  fair  trade  would  have  in  principle  greatly benefited  from  a  reduction  of  tariffs  on 
“colonial producs” and an elimination of escalating barriers which fix higher duties on transformed 
products with respect to raw materials. Such initiatives would have greatly helped fair traders to 
increase the part of value added appropriated by marginalised producers in the South. 
With regard to microfinance, as it is well known, profitability and outreach are inversely correlated 
and those MFI initiatives more directly targeted to the poor required subsidies to survive. However 
such subsidies came from foundations, socially responsible investors (accepting lower returns on 
their deposits to finance MFIs) and private donors and, generally, not from government.
The above mentioned features and the history of these initiatives demonstrated that their businesses
are sustainable and pushed profit maximising players to enter in these fields (coops, Starbucks, 
Nestlè and even McDonalds and Wal-Mart recently in fair trade, and many financial institutions in 
microfinance).
In spite of it, at the present state of affairs, the role of the state could be of great importance to foster 
these  initiatives  and  contribute  to  the edification  of  an  economic  system  in  which  creation  of 
economic value may be reconciled with social and environmental sustainability. 
We must not forget that competition does not occur in a rule-free environment. On the contrary, 
success of one or another player does not depend only on its intrinsic quality but also on the rules of 
the game. This is absolutely evident in environmental regulation where new pro-environment rules 
(such as limited access or access charge to big metropolitan areas based on environmental quality of 
cars) or simply expectations of their implementation may be crucial to tilt the competitive race in 
favour of the more environmental-friendly producers.
More in detail, we believe that, if the government cares about redressing economic activity in a 
more socially and environmentally sustainable direction, and if it understands that failure to do so 
would imply high welfare costs, it should take two types of cost-free and costly initiatives.
The cost-free initiatives involve regulation on social rating and pro-socially responsible players 
procurement  rules.  The  costly  initiative  concern  various  forms  of  tax  allowances,  once  the 
                                                
12 We generally define unbankables all those potential borrowers lacking of a collateral and 
generally being refused for that by ordinary banks.14
contribution of social responsibility to societal wellbeing and its positive effect on  government 
budget is properly taken into account.
On  the  first  point  it  must  be  considered that  consumers’  and  investors’  willingness  to  pay  for 
socially  and  environmentally  responsible  features  of  products  is  extremely  high  according  to 
surveys run in different parts of the worlds. As already mentioned in section 3 more than 50 percent 
of the population would prefer the more socially  and environmentally responsible product if price 
and quality are the same with respect to a standard product. Around 20 percent of the population 
would be willing to pay up to 10 percent more for the former.
These large numbers do not often become market shares because they are based on a “virtual” 
choice (availability on each shelf of the above mentioned two products and full information on their 
characteristics) which is not available in the reality. A compulsory norm on the disclosure of social 
rating on companies selling products would greatly help. Such norm would not create any distortion 
or  discrimination  at  country  or  industry  level, since  it  would  pose  the  same  obligation  on  all 
producers selling in a given country. Furthermore, it would contribute significantly to an increase in 
information and in the capacity of portfolio vote of consumers and investors who would remain free 
to use or not the new information. As it occurs in the industry of financial rating (with S&P, Moody 
and  Fitch),  competition  among  the  most  important  players  should  ensure  that  social  rating 
information  come  from  a  variety  of  independent  sources  (in  our  case  they  may  be  the  well 
established KLD, Ethibel, Eiris, etc. already selling their services to ethical investment funds and 
the general public).
Social rating would met into some problems which are very close to those of financial  rating. 
Conflicts of interests between rating agencies and corporate customers (which would have to pay 
for the rating) could be reduced by the creation of a multistakeholder authority. Fixed costs of social 
rating should be an unsustainable burden for small firms and a different treatment for them should 
be allowed. In spite of all the inevitable limits and problems, the compulsory social rating system 
(on product labels or on market shelves ?) would greatly contribute to spur the debate on the issue 
and provide firms with the right market incentives to adopt socially responsible strategies.
The second field of (cost-free?) intervention is procurement rules. It is true that, by giving points to 
socially  and  environmentally  responsible  features  of  competitors, the  public  sector  could  be 
ultimately led to purchase goods and services at slightly higher prices. On the other hand, a blind 
application  of  the  minimum  price  rule  would  seem  nonsensical  given  the  overall  public  (and 
Lisbon) goal  of matching  creation of economic value with social cohesion and environmental 
sustainability.
6. Conclusions 
No one denies that macroeconomics, institutional reforms and infrastructures are fundamental to 
promote  economic  development  and  social  cohesion.  In  the  traditional  western  democracies 
grassroot voice on this issue was mainly limited to the participation to political life and, for most 
people participation is limited  to the electoral vote.
However, global integration of market economies, the weakness of international institutions which 
are not directly elected and the lack of global governance rules aimed to address the issues of global 
public goods made always more clear that an economic system may not works by just waiting for 
such “top down” intervention. 
In addition to it, a longstanding tradition of participated action of non governmental organisations 
has often demonstrated that local community organisations, which are closer to social problems and 
are  composed  by  motivated  members,  may  tackle  more  effectively  social  and  environmental
problems. Such organisations have proven  that they can do better than the molochs of traditional 
welfare systems which often deals anonymously with beneficiaries providing scarce contribution to 15
the many times mentioned immaterial factors (trust, self esteem, dignity) which we showed to be so 
important in promoting social inclusion.
These are the reasons why quality and effectiveness of intervention in social and environmental 
issues will crucially depend in the future also from bottom-up participation and from the synergies 
between this participated action of the civil society and local, national governments and regulatory 
authorities. 
In this paper we presented the ethical and solidarity initiatives that, at the moment, have developed 
and  emerged  as  successful  and  sustainable  models  of  creation  of  economic,  social  and 
environmental value.  In presenting them we are fully aware of their limits as well as their great 
potential. Microfinance, fair trade, solidarity purchasing groups, ethical tourism are only examples 
of a more general principle which will inspire new historical realisations which we still do not see at 
the horizon today. 
The  principle  is  that  the  ultimate  masters  of  the  present  economic  system  are  neither  the 
governments  nor  large  corporations.  Both  of  them  crucially  depend  on  the  vote  of  citizens, 
consumers and investors. This implies that we cannot complain when we see something which we 
do not like since the ultimate responsibility for it is on us and on our portfolio vote.
To understand why the potential of these initiatives (which are there to remind us about our power) 
is enormous we may imagine what could happen if, say, 60 percent of individual would decide to 
give more money for solidarity or if they alternatively decide to choose products on the basis of 
price, quality but also social and environmental responsibility of producers. In the second case the 
additional  advantage  would  be  an  incredible  incentive  for  all  corporations  to  modify  their 
productive systems in direction of a “three-dimensional” integrated target of society wellbeing with 
increased consistence between creation of economic value and pursuit of social goals.
The existence of a potential does not mean that we are already there, nor it is a guarantee that we 
will definitely be there one day in the future. 
It only reminds us of an incredible opportunity we have to solve global imbalances with simple
everyday life choices. 
We generally complain about the changes we would like to see in politics and economics without 
being aware that we may be the main actors of that change.
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